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LEISURE AND LIBERAL EDUCATION: A PLEA FOR USELESSNESS
John E. Jalbert
Sacred Heart University

―But what is useless can nevertheless be a power—a power in the
rightful sense.‖
--Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics
INTRODUCTION
To paraphrase the opening line of a Henry David Thoreau essay, I
wish in this essay to speak a word for leisure, for human dignity, and for
freedom as opposed to amusement and occupation. Like the philosopher and
wilderness trekker from Concord, I want to make an extreme assertion: We
have aimed at usefulness long enough, now let us pursue a measure of
uselessness. Doing so will not be easy, because in our technological age
―uselessness‖ is thought a sin against the virtue of ―practicality.‖ 1 Thoreau
knew the importance of leisure and understood that, without it and its fruits,
human life is hollow, infected with ennui, and marked by ―quiet desperation.‖
Consequently, he served as the ―inspector of snowstorms and rainstorms,‖ so
he would have leisure to ―improve his soul‘s estate.‖2 Unlike many of us in the
modern academy – students, professors, and administrators – Thoreau had
firsthand acquaintance with the value of leisure because he was informed by an
intellectual tradition that privileged liberal learning. Although this tradition
reaches at least as far back as Plato and Aristotle, it is increasingly under attack
in the modern university, even by those of us who are its would-be defenders.
The reason is simple – our technological society and its representatives place
too high a premium on the values of utility, efficiency, and productivity.
Consequently, even leisure must be dedicated to production.
One cannot promote liberal education and ignore the fundamental
tension that exists between leisure and utility. ―To aim at utility everywhere,‖
Aristotle writes, ―is utterly unbecoming to high-minded and liberal spirits.‖3
Thus, my plea for leisure, for ―uselessness,‖ is a plea for the revitalization of
liberal education. It is not enough to ask, as does Nietzsche‘s ―last man,‖
―What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?‖ and then
―blinks.‖4 The ―last man‖ wants what is useful, what affords comfort and
security, so when he entertains the fundamental questions pertaining to human
existence, he does so without passion and conviction. These questions mean
nothing to him, so he ―blinks‖ as though slumber is never far off. But, perhaps
the blink signifies more than just fatigue and boredom. According to Martin
Heidegger, for instance, the blink indicates that a ―glittering deception‖ has
been put into play – one which by tacit agreement of everyone involved
remains unquestioned.
• 2009 Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society
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The association of liberal education with leisure and with uselessness
is hardly a new idea.5 The charge of uselessness is usually a disparaging one,
but it has also been employed to underscore the non-utilitarian nature of liberal
education. One of the most comprehensive treatments to date of liberal
education‘s uselessness is Daniel Cottom‘s Why Education is Useless.
According to Cottom, the uselessness of higher education ―. . . emerges from
the despair that eats away at our satisfactions and that questions even our
greatest and most pleasing certainties.‖ 6 Liberal education is useless in the
same manner that genuine thinking is useless: it disrupts, it challenges, it
undermines, in a word, it questions. It serves as a foil against what Cottom
calls the ―tyranny of stupidity.‖ Thus, the uselessness of liberal learning is its
―immeasurable value‖ and the reason why it should be acknowledged and
embraced by the academy.
More recently, Stanley Fish has challenged Cottom‘s conclusion as a
―back-door form of justification‖ for liberal education. If liberal education is
an intrinsic value, it requires no justification beyond itself. ―An unconcern
with any usefulness to the world is the key to its distinctiveness, and this
unconcern is displayed not in a spirit of renunciation . . . but is a spirit of
independence and the marking of territory.‖ 7 Despite some of his deliberately
provocative assertions, one can nonetheless appreciate Fish‘s insistence on the
need to differentiate liberal learning from education dedicated to external ends.
Liberal learning is characterized by inutility—Fish‘s word—or uselessness,
which can be traced back to Aristotle‘s view that philosophy ―exists for its own
sake.‖8 The pursuit of such knowledge requires leisure and is for the sake of
leisure. This does not preclude the fact that such knowledge may be utilized to
achieve any number of desirable ends, but it does mean that it has a value that
is independent of those ends.
But how should one respond to the inevitable query from today‘s
student, ―What can I do with it (liberal education)?‖ Taking a clue from
something Heidegger says about philosophy, one might respond by saying,
―What can I do with it?‖ is the wrong question to ask. The right question is,
―What can philosophy (or, liberal education) do with me, if I engage in it?‖
This view targets those few students who can and will avail themselves of the
opportunity to find out, because at least those few will experience the freedom
associated with liberal learning and will need no further justification. As for
those other students who do not enjoy the luxury of leisure today nor have
future prospects of it, it is precisely with such students in mind that I am saying
professors of the liberal disciplines should teach their disciplines as ends-inthemselves, rather than as means to external ends. Liberal education will not
disappear from the academic scene, but we may be in danger of reverting to the
elitism that was inherent in the Ancient distinction between the liberal and
servile arts. In The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of
the Humanities, Frank Donoghue calls attention to a disturbing trend whereby
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―the liberal arts education will increasingly become a luxury item, affordable
only to the privileged.‖9
Those not privileged will still be exposed to traditional liberal disciplines–
history, literature, and philosophy, for instance–but for the sake of work. This
is untarnished elitism and, if it comes to pass, will leave the majority of
university graduates in the position of ―slaves‖ who exist for the sake of others.
They will be paid for their labor, but they will nonetheless exist for the sake of
the marketplace. The measure of their value will be reduced to what they can
do, not what they are.
The struggle within the academy between vocationally oriented
education and liberal education has deep historical roots. What is unique to the
contemporary scene is not that the proponents of liberal education are losing
ground, for they have been losing ground for a long time. Hunger, after all, is a
stronger, more compelling motivator than wonder and contemplation. What is
prominent in the academy today is that the would-be defenders of liberal
learning are now, either surreptitiously or unwittingly, giving ground. This is
precisely what we are doing whenever we advance the cause of liberal
education by rendering it useful, whenever we succumb to the language of
utility and spell out a litany of liberal learning outcomes, including everything
from the development of moral character to effective citizenship, and, let us not
forget, the ability to think critically.
The purpose of this essay is to encourage liberal educators to stop
giving ground, that is, to stop recasting liberal learning as a utilitarian activity
in order to meet society‘s demand for utility and productivity. There will
always be people in the academy who will give lip-service to liberal education
and then blink, and, although it is important to call attention to their blink, it is
more important that we go about our business of introducing students to liberal
learning writ large; that is to say, liberal learning for its own sake and not for
the sake of utilitarian ends. If we busy ourselves with only the latter, our
students may learn to write, think critically, and communicate effectively, but
they will not have access to the only real evidence there is for the intrinsic
value of liberal learning, namely, a cast of people whose lives have been and
continue to be informed by liberal education. In order to demonstrate the
intrinsic value of liberal learning for our students, we ourselves must embrace
and model it in our deeds, and this means to acknowledge its uselessness and to
cease repackaging it for the marketplace.
While much of the history of our topic has been covered by Cottom
and others, consideration of some crucial historical shifts will help us
understand how we arrived where we are today. Throughout history,
academics in general and liberal educators in particular have had to fend off
demands that liberal education be made useful. But history of the topic also
teaches that despite the tension between vocational and liberal learning, the
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representatives of liberal education have always had a place at the table. Until
now, that is. If Donoghue is correct, ―professors of the humanities have
already lost the power to rescue themselves.‖10 Perhaps, but while we still have
a place in the modern university we should, as Fish would say, do our jobs. We
should represent our disciplines and not some utilitarian reinterpretation of
them. Our students deserve nothing less.
LEISURE AND THE UNIVERSITY
Leisure is inseparable from the idea of a university. Indeed, the words
leisure and university are virtually synonymous, as the German philosopher
Josef Pieper reminds us. The Greek term for leisure is schole, and it is the
etymological root of the Latin word schola and the German word schula, both
of which, of course, mean school.11 It is not surprising then that, for Plato and
Aristotle, as well as for their medieval counterparts, leisure is associated not
with inactivity but with the highest form of activity, that is, with speculative or
contemplative thought. Thus, the contrast to leisure is not activity per se, but
occupation or employment. For this reason, leisure must also be distinguished
from play and amusement, inasmuch as they are in service to occupation and
work rather than contemplation. As Aristotle puts it, ―We can hardly fill our
leisure with play. . . . Play is a thing to be chiefly used in connexion with one
side of life—the side of occupation.‖12
A liberal education informs a person in the proper use of leisure.
Looking to Aristotle once more, we read in the Politics that ―. . . there are some
branches of learning and education which ought to be studied with a view to
the proper use of leisure in the cultivation of the mind. It is clear, too, that
these studies should be regarded as ends in themselves, while studies pursued
with a view to an occupation should be regarded merely as means and matters
of necessity.‖13 Studies that aim at occupation are intended to put one in
possession of things, while the liberal studies and leisure are intended to put
one in possession of oneself. The distinction is a crucial one because things
have merely a market value, a price, while selfhood and personal authenticity
have intrinsic worth and are, therefore, alone deserving of esteem.
Liberal education, as the word liberal suggests, is intimately connected
with the idea of personal freedom. For the Greeks, liberal education was
thought to be suitable for free men (and women), while training in the
mechanical arts or skills was suitable for those whose lives were defined by
work. The medieval thinkers, even though they dignified work in a way that
Aristotle and Plato did not, nonetheless continued to assign priority to what
they called the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) as opposed to the active
life (vita activa). The contemplative life is superior and freer because it is
neither subordinated nor dedicated to the acquisition of inferior external ends.
For Thomas Aquinas, the distinction between the liberal arts and the servile
arts parallels the distinction between contemplative and active life and draws
on the distinction between intellectus and ratio.14 Intellectus, or intuitive
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knowing, is a form of intellectual seeing; it is receptive insofar as it receives,
beholds, and contemplates the highest objects of knowledge, which include the
True, the Good, and the Beautiful. In contrast, ratio, or discursive reason,
judges and assesses the matters under consideration, collects and interprets
data, draws conclusions from premises, etc. Ratio is the basis of scientific
knowledge (scientia) and lends itself, by extension, to technological
application, while intellectus is the ground of wisdom (sapientia).
With the technological interpretation of modern science, René
Descartes, like his contemporary Francis Bacon, challenged the ancient and
medieval view that the highest form of knowledge—that which contributed to
human excellence—was knowledge for its own sake. In the Discourse on
Method (1637), Descartes articulates the principal aim of a scientific method
that conjoined him with Bacon and compelled him to reject scholasticism and
Aristotelianism. He held in ―esteem,‖ he says, the study of ancient literature,
languages, and theology, and, less positively, philosophy but views all of them
as having the same underlying deficiency—they all involve speculations that
lead to unusable results. The proper end of science is useful knowledge, not
erudition. Indeed, the reason he gives for publishing his thoughts on method is
that his method of scientific investigation, unlike the speculative philosophy of
the past, would make it ―possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in
life.‖15 There is no denying that Descartes was correct to condemn the nearly
slavish adherence to Aristotelian science that was common at the time, and his
primary goal of wanting, among other things, to ―free‖ humanity from
―maladies of body and mind‖ and ―infirmities of age‖ 16 is likewise laudable.
Unfortunately, the success of his philosophical program also gave rise to an
attitude that has probably done as much to imprison as it has to free us. We
cling more tenaciously than ever to the illusion of our own omnipotence. This
attitude is glaringly evident in Descartes‘ claim that his method would give rise
to a practical philosophy that would render human beings the ―masters and
possessors of nature.‖ This, of course, is sheer hubris, and, even if we allow
that modern technology has indeed given us control over nature, without the
moral anchor implicit in the ancient notion of reality, we are denied the means
whereby we can regain a modicum of control over our own power to control. 17
As regards our power to control our exercise of power, we have become
increasingly powerless. Thus, the expansion of human power over nature is
accompanied by a contraction of our being and intrinsic worth. What is
occluded is precisely what gives human beings their worth and dignity, namely,
the contemplative and receptive capacities of the human intellect.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Despite Descartes‘ and
Bacon‘s technological interpretations of science, liberal education continued to
be associated with the idea of human freedom during and after the
Enlightenment, for it was believed that only those who can think well and think
for themselves enjoy genuine freedom. What good is freedom from physical
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constraints and maladies if the mind is shackled due to a lack of cultivation and
a preoccupation with mundane affairs? But, more recently, the narrative of
emancipation, of freedom, has been challenged by postmodernism. Even here,
though, it is noteworthy that Jean-Francois Lyotard‘s observations in The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) are descriptive rather
than proscriptive.
Lyotard‘s credentials as a postmodern thinker
notwithstanding, his break with the tradition, if one may call it such, retains
significant ties with the tradition. For example, Lyotard acknowledges, but
does not endorse, the view that knowledge is no longer regarded as an end in
itself: ―The question (overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist
student, the State, or institutions of higher education is no longer ‗Is it true?‘
but ‗What use is it?‘. . . ‗Is it saleable?‘ . . . ‗Is it efficient?‘ . . . What no longer
makes the grade is competence as defined by other criteria true/false,
just/unjust, etc.—and, of course, low performativity in general.‖ 18
It is worth noting that, even though Lyotard does not buy into the
cosmology and metaphysics of the ancient and medieval philosophers, he also
does not entirely abandon the element of receptivity that accompanied their
notion of intellectus, which, as we said, is the highest function of the mind.
―Thinking,‖ he writes, ―like writing or painting, is almost no more than letting
a givable come towards you.‖19 Or, again, ―In what we call thinking the mind
isn‘t ‗directed‘ but suspended. You don‘t give it rules. You teach it to
receive.‖20 To think is to suffer—to be receptive to that which shows itself,
rather than trying to master and control it.
FREEDOM AND THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN BEINGS
The central role of the liberal or liberating arts is to free us, if only for
short periods of time, from mundane affairs, from the need to subordinate our
lives, wills, and intellects to external demands, from the need—whether real or
merely felt—to place ourselves under the sway of the marketplace in order to
make a living. After all, human excellence requires more than the material
ends that are procured through labor, however important such ends may be in
their own right. We are reminded of this in Scripture when we read in the Old
and New Testaments that ―man does not live by bread alone.‖ It is to address
our higher intellectual and spiritual needs that a Sabbath is necessary, a day of
leisure, during which time we can distance ourselves from the menial tasks and
affairs of human existence. For the same reason, ancient temples were set-off
and separated from places that were dedicated to farming, grazing, and
supplying the material necessities of life. Temples were for the veneration of
the gods. From a practical point of view, such sites constituted wasted or
useless spaces. For similar reasons, Plato‘s Academy and Aristotle‘s Lyceum
were also ―unproductive‖ places. Indeed, in Plato‘s Republic, Adeimantus
condemns philosophers because they are ―useless to the many.‖ 21 Philosophy,
as it is sometimes said, ―bakes no bread.‖ Nor do history, poetry, literature,
and the natural and social sciences, at least not insofar as they participate in and
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form the core of a liberal arts education. What makes an art or science liberal
or illiberal is the end at which it aims rather than the subject matter per se.22
Thomas Merton is correct when he laments that, despite all our talk of
freedom, ―our civilization is strictly servile.‖ Why? Because our technological
culture is oriented ―exclusively to the useful.‖ 23 In the end, even human beings
are valued not because of what they are but because of their usefulness, which
can be measured and quantified, but not esteemed. ―It is by means of
technology that man the person, the subject of qualified and perfectible
freedom, becomes quantified, that is, becomes part of a mass—mass man—
whose only function is to enter anonymously into the process of production and
consumption.‖24 Merton is not suggesting that we should jettison modern
technology; even Merton believes that ―a technological society might
conceivably be a tranquil and contemplative one.‖25 However, his italics
indicate that he was not particularly sanguine about the likelihood of it coming
to pass anytime soon, and for good reason.
Before Merton, Heidegger expressed similar concerns when he argued
that modern technology reduces everything—including persons—to the status
of ―standing reserve.‖ From the perspective of modern technology, human
beings are resources, and the activity of thinking aims at nothing more than
calculation, manipulation, and production. Even thinking becomes useful and
loses its meditative character, which Heidegger tries to recapture with the
German word Gelassenheit, to let be, to contemplate, to listen rather than to
challenge, exploit, and manipulate. Human beings, however, are contemplative
beings—something that is largely ignored in modern academic institutions
where productivity and utility are the fundamental values. Education and
technology are now a couplet, and what is almost never broached is the
possibility that technology fosters an attitude that is contrary to the proper end
of liberal education. Merton‘s antidote against this state of affairs is the
rediscovery of the ―primary usefulness of the useless.‖ But who will
administer this antidote in the modern university, if not those who profess the
liberal disciplines?
To make manifest the essence of a phenomenon, the
phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl employed the method of free
eidetic variation, which harks back to the Greek word eidos or idea.26 Loosely
applying the eidetic method to the notion of a university, we can, for instance,
imagine it stripped of its field house and on-campus housing yet it remains a
university, stripped of professional and applied studies yet it remains a
university. But, if we imaginatively strip it of the liberal studies, the idea of a
university evanesces. We cannot imagine a university without mathematics,
without physics, without history, literature, philosophy, and the other liberal
arts. This does not mean that professional and technical training are
unimportant, but it does mean that they are not essential to the idea of a
university.
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In John Henry Newman‘s collected lectures on university education,
The Idea of a University, he uses the word ―idea‖ to underscore his expression
of what is essential for a university education, in other words, what a university
cannot be without and still remain a university. Newman‘s Idea of a University
addresses many of the issues I have been discussing, e.g., that there is an
essential difference between liberal and servile knowledge, that liberal
knowledge involves contemplation and thus requires leisure, that liberal
knowledge is its own end, and finally, that ―A university is . . . an Alma Mater,
knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.‖ 27 In
short, a university is not a business, and educators are not production managers.
The proper function of a university is liberal education, which means once
again that its end—its proper end—is the cultivation of the intellect for its own
sake.
It would be naive to think that the educational climate in Newman‘s
day was significantly different from our own. In fact, The Idea of a University
explicitly acknowledges and responds to those of his contemporaries who
believed, as many people do today, that university education should ―issue in
some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. . . . they argue that
where there is a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind.‖ 28
This, of course, is the performativity equation to which Lyotard calls attention.
These same people, according to Newman, go on to ask ―what is the real value
in the market of the article called ‗Liberal Education?‘‖ If a meaningful
existence could be had by means of productivity and consumption alone, we
might well abandon leisure altogether and relieve ourselves (and our students)
of the burdens of liberal education. But, if thoughtful people can agree that the
good life at its best requires the fruits of leisure and the liberal studies, then
what? How do we get past the myopia of the technological world view and the
―glittering deception‖ that asserts the value of a liberal education, while
justifying it in terms of occupation?
CONCLUSION
Of course, we can no more go back to Newman‘s university than we
can to the scholastic institutions of the Middle Ages or to the Lyceum of
Aristotle, but, fortunately, doing so is unnecessary for genuine participation in
the intellectual tradition that privileges leisure and liberal education.
Participation requires respect for the past, but participation does not mean
recovering and preserving the past as though it were a museum piece. On the
contrary, one must appropriate, transform, and advance what has been. A
tradition is a living thing. The modern university, insofar as it brings together
and pursues what Newman and others considered conflicting educational goals,
must find a way to accommodate the internal conflicts and tensions that arise
when the modern university seeks to provide undergraduates with liberal
education, while also contributing to the advancement of knowledge through
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research and publication and satisfying the demands (I hesitate to say ―needs‖)
of our contemporary, technological society.
Interestingly, Newman, I believe, was well aware of the tension that
would be generated by these divergent goals and sought to circumvent the
problem by proffering the idea of a university that would be free from the
demands of the marketplace. ―Performativity‖ would not be the measuring stick
of Newman‘s ideal university. The tension that follows from the conflicting
demands of research and teaching is put to rest by Newman by dedicating the
university to the ―diffusion‖ of knowledge, rather than to its ―advancement.‖
According to Newman, ―to discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are
also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He,
too, who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers is
unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new.‖ 29
For better or worse, American universities have accepted the
challenge of embracing three divergent interests—teaching, research, and
professional training, along with public service—and, as a result, it is
imperative that we remain mindful of the tension that this threefold task entails
and maintain a proper balance. From an administrative perspective, the
absence of tension may be desirable because it would make the whole more
manageable, but it would also be a sure sign that all of the interests of the
university have, in fact, given way to and become dominated by one interest—
the interest of the market-oriented, technological society that it serves. Nor is
this reorientation of the university a phenomenon that is unique to the United
States. Jacques Ellul, one of the most trenchant critics of modern technology,
laments that the modern university—by which he means the modern French
university—has become a technical school, where students prepare to fulfill a
position in technological society. 30 In such an environment, the humanities are
considered unproductive unless they are professionalized and/or brought under
the umbrella of technology. An oft-mentioned fear is that the university will
vanish unless it responds to the demands of technology and the market.
Perhaps it is time for those who still believe in the value of liberal education to
respond that the university is already in its death throes when it abandons the
liberal arts and sciences except for their role as marketable resources. But
almost no one in the academy would dismiss liberal education out of hand, so it
is not enough to listen when members of the academy praise liberal learning,
one must also watch their eyes to make certain they do not blink. For the sake
of the university, let us hope that there remain a courageous few who are
willing to embrace ―uselessness‖—a few who still hold and embody the
conviction that one is never more active and engaged than when one is doing
―nothing,‖31 that is to say, when one is thinking.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION – 2009/Volume 40

231

Notes
1

Thomas Merton, Love and Living, ed. Naomi Burton Stone and Brother
Patrick Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), 67.
2

See Henry David Thoreau, Walden in Walden and Other Writings of Henry
David Thoreau, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 1992), 17
and The Journals of Henry David Thoreau, ed. Odell Shepard (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), 10; February 11, 1840.
3

Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1958), 337; VIII. iii. 12. 1338b. Aristotle does not
say that liberal persons should avoid aiming at utility altogether, but that they
should avoid aiming at utility ―everywhere.‖ The distinction between leisure
and utilitarian concerns is not intended as a way of distinguishing between two
classes of people, but as a means of distinguishing between two types of human
needs and interests.
4

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Viking Press, 1966), 17.
5

As regards liberal education and leisure, see Kevin Gary, ―Leisure, Freedom,
and Liberal Education,‖ Educational Theory 56, no. 2 (2006) and Josef Pieper,
Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbury (South Bend, IN: St.
Augustine Press, 1998). Pieper‘s volume deserves the attention of everyone
interested in the historical roots and goals of liberal education. On the
uselessness of liberal education, see especially Daniel Cottom, Why Education
is Useless (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
6

Cottom, Why Education is Useless, 204.

7

Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 56-57.
8

Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. by Hippocrates G. Apostle
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1970), 982b and Nicomachean
Ethics, Loeb Classical Library, trans. H. Rackmham (London: William
Heinemann, Ltd., 1968), 613-615; X. vii. 4-7.
9

Frank Donoghue, The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the
Fate of the Humanities (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), xvii.
See also 92, 126-128.
10

Donoghue, The Last Professors, xi.

11

Pieper, Leisure, 3-4 and 48.

12

Aristotle, Politics, 335; VIII, iii, 3-4.

13

Aristotle, Politics, 336; VIII, iii, 6.

232

Jalbert – Leisure and Liberal Education

14

Pieper, Leisure, 11 and 34-35. See also Hannah Arendt, The Human
Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 290-294.
Arendt recognizes the original juxtaposition of contemplation and action, but
argues that in time contemplation becomes a moment within active life and yet
distinct from it.
15

René Descartes, Discourse on Method in The Philosophical Works of
Descartes, Vol. I, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 119.
16

Descartes, Discourse on Method, 120.

17

As Anthony T. Kronman notes, ―We have a desire for control that can never
be satisfied by any degree of control we actually achieve.‖ See his Education’s
End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of
Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 231.
18

Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984), 51.
19

Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by G.
Bennington and R. Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991),
18.
20

Ibid., 19.

21

Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books,
1968), 487d and 489b.
22

Ortega y Gasset, for example, distinguishes between physics and biology
conducted as rigorous sciences and as cultural disciplines, and, on his view, it
is in their latter capacity that they play a pivotal role in the university. See José
Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University, ed. and trans. Howard Lee Nostrand
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 65.
23

Thomas Merton, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander (New York: Doubleday,
1966), 308.
24

Ibid., 76. See also 308 and Love and Living, 23.

25

Merton, Love and Living, 79.

26

For a detailed account of the eidetic method, see Edmund Husserl,
Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925, trans. John
Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 53-65.
27

John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, ed. Frank M. Turner (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 104-105.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION – 2009/Volume 40
28

233

Ibid., 110.

29

Ibid., 5. Cf., however, Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the University: A
Reexamination (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), 80-81 and 121ff.
See also Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 206-207. Kerr, who was Chancellor of the
University of California, Berkeley, falls somewhere in between Newman and
Pelikan, for he acknowledges the advantages of coupling research/publication
and teaching for graduate education, but denies the advantages for
undergraduate education.
30

Jacques Ellul, The Technological System, trans. Joachim Neugroshel (New
York: Continuum, 1980), 245 and 312.
31

I am alluding here to specific observations put forth by Heidegger and
Arendt. See Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From
Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1999), 87. See Human Condition, 324.

